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JURIS PRUDENCE:
CALABRESI’S UNEASY RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE COASE THEOREM
STEVEN G. MEDEMA*
I
INTRODUCTION
If the published record is any indication, Guido Calabresi’s association with
the Coase theorem is nearly as old as Coase’s own. Indeed, an argument could
be made, judging by how the literature on the theorem has evolved, that
Calabresi “discovered” the Coase theorem roughly two years before Coase first
stated these ideas in print. What is incontrovertible is that Calabresi has
devoted far more words to discussion of the theorem than did Coase, though
this is an easy mark given that Coase had almost nothing to say on the subject
after 1961—at least until taking some pains in a 1988 collection of his most
significant articles to explain what he was on about in The Problem of Social
1
Cost and how all of the attention paid to the theorem represented a
2
misunderstanding of his message. Among legal scholars, few have referenced
Coase’s negotiation result more often than has Calabresi, and perhaps no one
3
has probed its implications so deeply.
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1. 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, The Problem of Social Cost].
2. See R.H. COASE, Notes On the Problem Of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE
LAW 157 (1988) [hereinafter COASE, Notes]. Coase’s two pre-1988 commentaries are R.H. Coase,
Social Cost and Public Policy, in EXPLORING THE FRONTIERS OF ADMINISTRATION: SIX ESSAYS FOR
MANAGERS 33 (George A. Edwards ed., 1970), in which he simply restates in summary form the major
conclusions of The Problem of Social Cost, and R.H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core:
A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON. 183 (1981), in which he defends his negotiation result.
3. In this article, I use the terms “Coase theorem” and “Coase’s negotiation result”
interchangeably, recognizing that the former, although generally associated with the latter, did not
appear in the literature until 1966 and did not achieve widespread use until well into the 1970s. See
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966).
Evidence of the primacy of Calabresi’s treatments of Coase comes from the author’s database
of some 6000 articles referring to the Coase theorem or The Problem of Social Cost. (The database can
be approximated via HeinOnline and Jstor searches, on file with Law and Contemporary Problems.)
The data suggest that, within the legal literature, only Richard Posner and Robert Cooter have
discussed Coase’s result more often than has Calabresi.
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The Coase theorem is one of the most controversial ideas to emerge within
economics and law over the last half century, and the literature discussing or
4
invoking it runs to some 6000 articles, as well as many hundreds of books. It is
an idea that is in equal turns mystical and infuriating, its beauty—or lack
thereof—being in the eye of the beholder. Calabresi’s attitude toward the
theorem has, over time, oscillated to both of these extremes, and to various
points in the middle. Some of this oscillation is an artifact of his own evolving
views, while other aspects are a function of the context in which he considered
Coase’s result. In all of this, though, Calabresi’s engagement with Coase’s
negotiation result provides an interesting window onto the history of the Coase
theorem—an idea that played a fundamentally important role in reshaping
aspects of both legal and economic analysis in the last third of the twentieth
century.
In choosing the subject of this article I have assumed that there is something
called the “Coase theorem,” and in the title I suggest that Calabresi has had an
uneasy relationship with it—whatever it is. The problem is that the Coase
theorem admits of no singular definition—a fact that, as it turns out, helps to
explain Calabresi’s uneasy relationship with it. In fact, his to-and-fro with the
Coase theorem is in some ways a microcosm of the theorem’s larger history, a
5
subject that lies well beyond the scope of the present article. If one can,
however, speak of a “typical” statement of the Coase theorem, it might go
something like this: If transaction costs are zero and property rights over the
relevant resources are well-defined, parties involved in an externality situation
will bargain to an efficient and invariant resolution, regardless of to whom the
6
property rights are initially assigned. So stated, the theorem embodies two
assumptions and two conclusions. The theorem embodies the assumptions that
property rights are well defined and the costs of transacting are zero. The
conclusions that emerge are that the resulting allocation of resources will be
efficient and that this result will be invariant across alternative assignments of
rights. But the theorem has been stated in innumerable ways over the years—
with and without the invariance result, and with various additional assumptions
or qualifications—and its scope has been expanded well beyond the simple

4. Id.
5. This article is part of a much larger project in which I trace the intellectual history of the Coase
theorem, including its diffusion in the legal literature. See, e.g., Steven G. Medema, 1966 and All That:
The Birth of the Coase Theorem Controversy, 36 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT (forthcoming Sept. 2014);
Steven G. Medema, The Curious Treatment of the Coase Theorem in Environmental Economics, 19601979, 8 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming Winter 2014) (discussing aspects of the Coase
theorem’s early history in economics and law); Steven G. Medema, Debating Law’s Irrelevance: Legal
Scholarship and the Coase Theorem in the 1960s (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Medema, Debating Law’s
Irrelevance] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Colorado Denver); Steven G.
Medema, Rethinking Externalities: Coase’s Negotiation Result Before the Coase Theorem (Apr. 24,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Colorado Denver).
6. See Steven G. Medema, The Coase Theorem: Lessons for the Study of the History of Economic
Thought, 33 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 1 (2011).
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property-rights solutions initially contemplated by Coase. Calabresi’s various
engagements with Coase’s result reflect the elusiveness of this target.
In the pages that follow, I will analyze Calabresi’s relationship with the idea
8
that has come to be known as the Coase theorem. Because much of Calabresi’s
work with the Coase theorem occurred on the front end of the theorem’s
history, Calabresi was a player in how the Coase-theorem discussion played out
in the early years—particularly within law. This early engagement also made
him responsible—both directly, through his writings, and indirectly, through his
students and others influenced by his writings—for much of the early diffusion
9
of the Coase theorem in legal literature. Calabresi was a legal scholar with
roots in both economics and legal realism who was enamored of the potential
power of Coase’s result as he (Calabresi) interpreted it—an interpretation in
certain ways radically different from Coase’s own conception of his negotiation
result—even if not convinced of its real-world applicability. Although he
initially found in Coase’s result the basis for legal-decision criteria that would
promote efficient allocations of resources, Calabresi eventually concluded that
its true power lay in its implications for the distributional effects of legal rules.
II
THE ACCIDENTAL TOURIST
The road that took Calabresi to the application of price theory to legal
issues—a road that included extensive economics studies—has been related on
10
several occasions by Calabresi himself and so will not be rehearsed here.
Instead, the concern here goes to one facet of how Calabresi’s economics
training influenced his approach to legal analysis. The initial manifestation of
his interest in integrating economics into legal analysis was, of course, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, originally written as a
paper during Calabresi’s law school days but not published as an article until
11
1961. What the article has to do with the Coase theorem, though, does not
admit to a simple answer, in spite of its established place in the Coase-theorem
12
literature.
7. For a litany of statements of the Coase theorem, see id. See also THE COASE THEOREM
(Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 2013) (containing reprints of a substantial number of the
most significant articles from the Coase-theorem literature along with an original introduction by
Posner and Parisi); Steven G. Medema & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Coase Theorem, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 836 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
8. The subject of Calabresi and the Coase theorem has previously been taken up by Alain
Marciano. See Alain Marciano, Guido Calabresi’s Economic Analysis of Law, Coase and the Coase
Theorem, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 110 (2012). The present article is rather differently focused,
though it does provide additional insight into certain of the issues raised in Marciano’s analysis.
9. See generally Medema, Debating Law’s Irrelevance, supra note 5.
10. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736 (2005) [hereinafter
Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited].
11. 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Thoughts]. The story behind the
publication of this article is related in Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, supra note 10.
12. One perspective on this can be found in Marciano, supra note 8, at 111 (arguing that “the
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Central to Calabresi’s 1961 discussion is the claim, from welfare economics,
that “the most desirable system of loss distribution under a strict resourceallocation theory is one in which the prices of goods accurately reflect their full
13
cost to society.” For Calabresi, the application of the allocative-efficiency
criterion to individual torts—interactions thought to violate this efficiency
requirement because agents do not bear the full costs associated with their
actions—entails that the costs of a harm-causing activity be internalized to the
activity causing the harm and that the process of internalization should assign
that cost to the party who can best ensure that this cost is reflected in the pricing
14
of the good in question. This insight, of course, provided the basis for the least
15
cost–avoider rule later advocated by Calabresi in his analysis of tort liability.
Although Calabresi grounded his 1961 article in the claim that economics
could, and should, provide the basis for the allocation of accident costs, he
made no bones about his sense that, in the determination of the party on whom
to place tort liability in order to achieve the desired efficient outcome,
16
“traditional economic theory is of little help.” The problem, he said, is that “in
the economist’s world it often makes no difference whether, for example, the
17
cost of an injury is put on a worker or on his employer.” If employers were
liable for harm, they would offer their workers wage terms that were
correspondingly reduced, whereas if employees were liable, they would demand
higher wages to cover the cost of acquiring insurance or of self-insuring. “Either
way,” said Calabresi, the theory tells us that “the cost would find its way into
18
wages and into prices.” Thus, “[f]rom the standpoint of resource allocations—
though perhaps only from that standpoint—nothing would be changed” by
19
assigning liability to one party rather than the other.
The modern reader may be inclined to nod his or her head and conclude
that Calabresi had obviously read his Coase and learned his lessons well. But
given that Coase’s article was published only weeks before Calabresi’s article
appeared, and that Calabresi likely had no knowledge of Coase’s analysis there
20
or in The Federal Communications Commission at that point, he had almost
21
certainly not learned a thing from Coase. In fact, the allocative-neutrality
result referenced by Calabresi was, as he pointed out, a piece of theory whose
similarities and differences” between the works of Coase and Calabresi “are deeper and more
complex” than is generally recognized).
13. Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 11, at 505.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 135–173 (1970) [hereinafter CALABRESI, COSTS].
16. Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 11, at 505.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 506 n.25.
20. 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
21. Coase’s article, though bearing a 1960 publication date, did not appear in print until early in
1961. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago,
1932–1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 221 (1983).
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origins antedate Coase’s writing by at least a half-century. In short, Calabresi’s
proposal of allocative invariance was not anything new, at least to economists;
the allocative invariance of alternative specifications of legal liability, as he
made clear, was a widely accepted theoretical property of “the economist’s
23
world.”
But Calabresi was not willing to lend a great deal of empirical credence to
the economist’s world or to the economist’s theoretical claims about the
invariant effects of alternative liability assignments, labeling previous attempts
24
to apply this theory to the context of workplace accidents “inaccurate.” The
problem, he said, is that this theory “presupposes an all knowing, all rational
25
economic world which does not exist.” Reality, Calabresi argued, points us in a
different direction: Some assignments of risk do not allow for the transfer of the
26
relevant costs into prices, parties may evaluate risk differently, and the rates at
27
which parties are able to insure against risk may differ. Further, each of these
factors will cause a variation in prices, and thus incentives, across alternative
assignments of liability, thereby giving rise to output and activity levels that
vary with the assignment of liability. As such, the determination of liability will
28
tend to impact the efficiency of resource allocation.
That said, Calabresi did allow that there are some situations in which the
economist’s view of the problem is relevant—that is, “where it actually does not
29
matter who bears the loss initially.” He cited the utilization of independent
contractors and products-liability cases involving commercial buyers and sellers
as possible examples, because these may represent situations in which each
30
party is able to allocate the relevant cost to the appropriate activity or product.
Calabresi even allowed that this reasoning might apply to certain modern
workers’ compensation situations, given the development of strong labor unions

22. Calabresi cited works by economists Frank Taussig of Harvard and Harry Gunnison Brown as
representative of the received view. Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 11, at 506 n.23 (citing
FRANK W. TAUSSIG, 2 PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 326–27 (1911); Harry Gunnison Brown, The
Incidence of Compulsory Insurance of Workmen, 30 J. POL. ECON. 67 (1922)). Taussig’s book, of
course, was the leading U.S. textbook of the period, and Gunnison Brown made explicit reference in
his article to the widely accepted nature of the invariance proposition. See Brown, supra, at 77 (arguing
that “[it] will be obvious to the reader” that the costs of insurance against workplace accidents will
ultimately fall on the workers “regardless of their imposition . . . initially upon employers.”). As George
Stigler later noted regarding Coase’s result, the same logic was generally seen to apply to a range of
laws, perhaps most prominently to the incidence of a sales tax. See STIGLER, supra note 3, at 113.
23. Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 11, at 505.
24. Id. at 506.
25. Id.
26. For example, making pedestrians liable for auto–pedestrian accidents will not increase the
price of cars and so will not have a deterrent effect on automobile purchases—a factor that also
contributes to the accidents.
27. Calabresi, Some Thoughts, supra note 11, at 506.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 506 (emphasis added); see also id. at 545–47.
30. Id. at 506–07.
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(with their associated bargaining power) in some industries. Calabresi was
clearly of the mind, however, that the scope for such arrangements is quite
limited, and thus that the traditional economic theory is not likely to apply. In
such cases, he said, the assignment of liability is not a matter of indifference,
and efficiency considerations dictate that the cost burden be imposed on the
party who is “in a better position to allocate the cost of the particular loss to the
32
appropriate activity or merchandise.”
Calabresi, then, appears to have laid out his own Coase theorem–type
result—in a world without frictions the assignment of liability will give rise to an
efficient and invariant allocation of resources—at roughly the same time that
Coase was making his point in The Problem of Social Cost. Calabresi’s
presentation of this result—as one that was well-established in the economics
literature—makes for a stark contrast to the incredulity and resistance with
33
which Coase’s analysis was met in many quarters, including among economists.
But Calabresi also seemed to be giving rather little practical scope to this result,
limiting it to relationships between independent contractors and situations of
products liability—a far more narrow set of contexts than Coase himself was
contemplating when laying out his own analysis and certainly only a shadow of
what was to come in terms of the application of Coase’s insights at the hands of
others. Why was Calabresi’s treatment such a narrow one? And if this result
was well established in economic analysis, wherein lies the originality of Coase’s
1960 insight? The answers can be found in the distinction between the situations
treated by the economists upon whom Calabresi relied and the contexts within
which Coase situated his own analysis—a distinction Calabresi brought out
forcefully by 1965.
III
WORLDS APART
It was in The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
34
Costs (The Decision for Accidents) that Calabresi first brought Coase’s analysis
into his own discussion and, at the same time, clarified what had been only
implicit in his earlier discussion of market solutions. In The Decision for
Accidents, Calabresi emphasized that what allows markets, at least in theory, to
deal satisfactorily with harmful effects in certain contexts is the presence of a
preexisting or ongoing contractual relationship that can be modified to account
35
for the harmful effect or the potential for harmful effects. Basic supply-anddemand forces will work to internalize the relevant costs and the market

31. Id. at 506 n.25.
32. Id. at 506–07.
33. See, e.g., Stanislaw Wellisz, On External Diseconomies and the Government-Assisted Invisible
Hand, 31 ECONOMICA 345 (1964).
34. 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents].
35. Calabresi illustrated this with reference to Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221
(Minn. 1910). See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 726.
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process will, in theory, generate an efficient and invariant result. But again, this
was an insight that, as Calabresi emphasized, had long been recognized in the
economics literature.
A. Bringing Coase into the Story
All of this, of course, had very little to do with the context to which
Calabresi was addressing a significant part of his analysis: automobile accidents.
These accidents, after all, tend to involve interactions—for example, between
drivers or between drivers and pedestrians—in which there is no preexisting
bargaining relationship. Calabresi ascribed to Coase the insight that the same
efficiency and invariance results we observe in “bargaining situations”
(Calabresi’s term for interactions involving preexisting bargaining relationships)
can emerge from the much wider class of cases in which no preexisting market
36
or contractual relationship obtains. Calabresi’s interpretation of Coase’s
insight was as follows:
The argument runs that if the cost of a factory-smoke nuisance, for instance, is put on
the homeowner rather than on the factory, and the cheapest way to avoid this cost is
not for the homeowner to move or wear a gasmask but is for the factory to install a
smoke-clearing device or cut down production, the homeowner will pay the factory to
do this. On the other hand, if the cost is originally put on the factory, and the best way
to minimize the loss is to get the homeowners to move, the factory will find it cheaper
to pay for such a move rather than to cut down production. Either way, it is argued,
the market will find the cheapest way to deter or minimize the loss. And while there
may be some difference in the end as to who is richer and who is poorer, in terms of
general cost deterrence the same results will be achieved whoever bears the initial
37
loss.

What Coase had shown, Calabresi reasoned, was that “a bargaining relationship
can always be established” between the party on whom the loss originally falls
and the party who is best positioned to minimize the loss, and that “[i]n a
perfect world such a bargaining relationship will always result in the
appropriate minimization of the loss,” just as in the case of the preexisting
38
bargaining relationship.
That said, Calabresi found the possibilities associated with actually applying
Coase’s analysis to the context of accidents very remote, and he did not attempt
to offer an illustration of a situation in which Coase’s analysis might be put to
use, even in theory. Instead, he turned immediately to an elaboration of the
problems associated with making use of Coase’s result, pointing to the cost of
establishing a bargaining relationship, or setting up a market, in the first place—
of getting people to the table, so to speak—and free-riding behavior as
39
particularly problematic issues. Although the presence of a preexisting
36. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 729 n.26.
37. Id. at 729.
38. Id. at 730 (emphasis added). See also Guido Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims? Views
and Overviews, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 601, 607 [hereinafter Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims?]
(“Coase’s analysis points out that, in theory, any ‘independent’ situation can be transformed into a
bargaining situation.”).
39. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 730–31.
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bargaining relationship offered some hope that efficient deterrence could be
accomplished regardless of how liability was assigned, Calabresi was of the
mind that absent such a relationship “practical limitations” attending bargains
40
“are significant enough to exclude their being the answer.” Thus, when
Calabresi concluded, as he had in The Decision for Accidents, that “[f]or both
theoretical and practical reasons . . . there are many situations in which we
cannot assume that it makes no difference, in terms of accident deterrence, who
41
is saddled with the original liability,” we are left to assume that the window
Calabresi left open referred to the preexisting-bargaining situation and that,
from where he stood, Coase’s analysis had added little, if anything, to the
42
discussion of practical accident remedies.
B. Reluctant Non-Coasean
But there is more to Calabresi’s commentary on Coase than this
applicability-related dismissal would appear to indicate. It seems clear that at
the time he wrote The Decision for Accidents Calabresi very much wished he
could put Coase’s result to actual use. He described Coase’s analysis as an
43
“ingenious attempt” to show that parties not in a preexisting bargaining
relationship will arrive at the same position as parties who are in such a
relationship and lamented that it was “too bad” that Coase’s theory was not
44
“frequently workable.” Why, then, was Calabresi so taken with Coase’s result?
One might infer that the answer lies in the resonance between the Coase
theorem and Calabresi’s goal of achieving an efficient tort-law system. The
Coase theorem, after all, tells us that such a result is guaranteed if the world
45
matches up to the relevant assumptions. But this would be at best an
oversimplification and perhaps even completely off the mark. Calabresi’s
wistfulness for a Coase-theorem world was not, per se, motivated by the
alluring implication that, in such a world, we could be indifferent about
assignments of liability. Indeed, Calabresi was never, even in theory, indifferent
about assignments of liability. Instead, his thinking was more instrumentally
oriented: The ability of parties to internalize costs in the absence of a

40. Guido Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J.
216, 231–32 n.28 (1965) [hereinafter Calabresi, Wonderful World]. Calabresi was reacting against Blum
and Kalven, who also had taken up Coase’s negotiation result, only to immediately dismiss it on the
grounds of irrelevance. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a Private
Law Problem—Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964) [hereinafter Blum & Kalven,
Public Law Perspectives].
41. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 731.
42. The “theoretical” reason goes to a critique that Calabresi leveled against Coase’s result, which
is discussed in part IV.
43. Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40, at 231.
44. Id. at 231–32 n.28. That the dispute between Blum and Kalven on the one hand and Calabresi
on the other did not go to the validity of Coase’s negotiation result is reflected in Blum and Kalven’s
1967 rebuttal to Calabresi. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Empty Cabinet of Dr.
Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 264 n.53 (1967).
45. See supra pp. 66–67.
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preexisting bargaining relationship would make his preferred guidelines for
assigning liability in the bargaining case just that much more broadly
46
applicable. To understand Calabresi’s logic here, we need to return to the case
of the preexisting bargaining relationship.
Calabresi was of the mind that, in theory, the assignment of liability would
not affect allocation if the parties were in a preexisting bargaining relationship.
47
But reality, he said, can be far-removed from economic theory. Given this,
Calabresi noted, we cannot depend on market processes to generate an efficient
and invariant outcome and instead need to focus attention on several factors
that determine, from a deterrence perspective, which party is the better loss
bearer. These factors, he said, include:
1) which of the parties can better evaluate the risk involved; 2) which of the parties
can better evaluate the accident proneness of potential parties on the other side; 3)
which of the parties can better let this knowledge, when significant, be reflected in the
prices it can command; 4) which of the parties can more cheaply insure against the
liability; and 5) placing liability on which of the two parties is less
likely to cause the
48
loss to be removed from both, for compensation or other reasons.

That is, as the bargaining theory tells us, we can expect that costs will be
internalized into the price, but we can only be assured that they will be properly
or efficiently internalized if rights are assigned appropriately in light of the
49
guidance provided by the factors enumerated above. If rights are not assigned
appropriately, higher than optimal costs will be translated into market prices,
50
and the end result will be inefficient.
This allows us to understand why Calabresi expressed regret over what he
considered the largely irrelevant nature of Coase’s result. It was not that the
cost-minimizing outcome would obtain regardless of how rights are assigned.
Instead, his view was that, “were Coase’s theory frequently workable,” the
above-enumerated “guidelines for liability derived in the bargaining case would
51
apply [in the absence of a preexisting bargaining relationship] as well.” In
Calabresi’s world, getting to efficiency is a multistep process. The first step is to
assign liability to those parties—or, more accurately, to that class of agents
(drivers, pedestrians, and so forth)—who can most cheaply internalize the
52
relevant costs. The second step is to translate these costs into the prices faced
53
by all agents. On Calabresi’s reading, what Coase had provided was the key to
unlocking this second step in the absence of an existing bargaining or market
relationship: That is, the establishment of liability allows for the creation of a
market framework for interaction that was not previously present. But if the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 224, 231.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 231–32 n.28.
Id. at 225.
Id.
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costs of establishing such a market are too high, as Calabresi expected they
generally would be, there is no mechanism for transmitting the relevant costs
54
into each of the prices faced by each of the affected parties. The costs,
therefore, are not internalized in a way that will generate efficient outcomes. If
one could be assured that the establishment of liability would lead to the
creation of a bargaining relationship, then the translation of costs into price
would be assured, and the only efficiency-related task would be ensuring that
liability is assigned to the party who could internalize the harm at lowest cost.
The above-enumerated factors would provide guidance in achieving this goal,
55
just as in the case of a preexisting bargaining relationship. But alas, Calabresi
56
considered this prospect extremely remote.
C. Ronald’s World Versus Guido’s World
Though it is commonly suggested in the Coase-theorem literature and
appears, on the face of it, that Coase and Calabresi were speaking the same
language, the preceding paragraphs suggest that this is not case. Yes, like
Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss, both of them were of the mind that all is for the best in
57
the best of all possible worlds, and their respective discussions were tempered
by the recognition—amply evident in both Coase’s discussion and Calabresi’s—
58
that transaction costs tend to get in the way in the real world. In fact, however,
the worlds about which they spoke—that is, the contexts within which they laid
out their respective analyses—were rather different, and hints of these
differences are evident both in Calabresi’s earliest discussions of Coase’s insight
and throughout his subsequent writings on this subject.
One of the things that stands out when studying Calabresi’s discussion of
tort remedies, including Coasean solutions, is that these analyses are
consistently conducted on a large-numbers or market level. Calabresi’s Coase
theorem was not one that involved, or at least focused on, the two-party,
59
bilateral exchange analysis of Coase’s farmer and cattle rancher or of the
60
physician and the confectioner in Sturges v. Bridgman. Instead, the parties
involved are the class of injurers and the class of victims, as in his discussions of
automobile manufacturers, drivers and pedestrians, farmers and cattle ranchers,
61
and the like. Calabresi was speaking of the possibilities and problematics of
accident-costs internalization within a market process involving these classes of

54. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 730–32.
55. Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40, at 224, 231; Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents,
supra note 34, at 730.
56. Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40.
57. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE, OR, OPTIMISM 4 (Theo Cuffe ed. & trans., Penguin Books 2005) (1759).
58. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1, at 15. On Calabresi, see infra pp. 75–76.
59. See infra pp. 75–76.
60. See Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852 (U.K.) (involving a physician whose ability to
practice medicine was impeded by the noise emanating from the premises of an adjacent confectioner).
61. See, e.g., CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 15, at 136; Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents,
supra note 34, at 730 n.28.
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agents, and his quest was for legal rules that would internalize costs to the
relevant class(es) of actors in a way that minimized accident-related costs.
Coase, in contrast, devoted his attention to two-party situations, where there is
62
a single injurer and a single victim.
This, then, brings us to the crux of Calabresi’s interest in Coase’s negotiation
result and, indeed, to his conceptualization of Coase’s insight in The Problem of
Social Cost. The Coase theorem, for Calabresi, said, in effect, that where a
market does not exist to internalize costs, the assignment of liability will have
the effect of creating a set of market or market-like interconnections between
classes of agents that will cause relevant costs to be reflected in the prices faced
by all agents—in the case of automobiles, for example, all drivers and all
63
pedestrians. And in a world without frictions, the market processes envisioned
by Calabresi and the negotiation processes contemplated by Coase will, by their
64
respective logics, generate efficient and invariant outcomes.
This large numbers–small numbers distinction has important implications
for our understanding of what Calabresi was on about in his discussions of the
Coase theorem. The most significant of these implications arises in his
discussion of transaction costs, which, for Calabresi, meant “costs like those of
getting large numbers of people together to bargain, and costs of excluding free
65
loaders.” The focus here is on the cost of setting up a market—a recurrent
66
theme in Calabresi’s commentaries on the Coase theorem. Coase, in contrast,
placed significant emphasis on the costs associated with the negotiation process
67
itself—costs to which Calabresi, for his part, paid little attention. In fact, it was
only in The Costs of Accidents, in 1970, that Calabresi modified his discussion to
68
include an emphasis on the costs associated with the negotiation context itself.

62. In fact, Calabresi did Coase one better by arguing that liability in the conflict between
polluters and those who suffer from pollution could be assigned to some third-party class of agents (for
example, television manufacturers) and these agents then would undertake the bribes necessary to
bring about the efficient result if transaction costs were zero. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents,
supra note 34, at 731–32 n.30.
63. See id. at 729–30.
64. It should be noted that this result holds regardless of the number of parties in Coase’s
negotiation scheme. That is, if transaction costs are zero, the number of negotiating parties is irrelevant.
When it comes to actually applying the result in the real world, however, the assumption of zero
transaction costs becomes increasingly tenuous as the number of parties to the bargain increases, as
Coase recognized.
65. Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11
J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 n.5 (1968) [hereinafter Calabresi, Transaction Costs].
66. The earliest mentions of this occur in Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at
730–31, and Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40, and we find this theme carried through his
discussions of Coase’s result in the 1970s, see infra Part VI.
67. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1, at 15. Calabresi was well aware of the fact
that his conception of transaction costs differed significantly from that of Coase, though he never made
a connection between their respective emphases and the distinction between the large-numbers
character of his own analysis and the small-numbers character of Coase’s. See Calabresi, Transaction
Costs, supra note 65.
68. CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 15.
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The costs of establishing a market and the problem of free riding, of course,
are not relevant in the case of the preexisting bargaining relationship, because a
market through which costs could potentially be internalized is already in place.
In the absence of a preexisting bargaining relationship, however, a market
within which all potential injurers and potential victims interact must be
established for costs to be internalized, and this process, as Calabresi
69
recognized, is almost certain to be extremely (and likely prohibitively) costly.
70
Moreover, a handful of free-riding agents can destroy the entire process. In
Coase’s two-party bargaining situations, by contrast, these considerations are
not terribly relevant: There is no market to be set up, because one party needs
only to commence the process of negotiating with the other, and there are no
parties on whose actions one can free ride. Although Coasean bilateralnegotiation processes are by no means costless in the real world, this
environment would seem to offer a context better suited to negotiated solutions
than would the background against which Calabresi articulated his analysis of
tort remedies.
IV
FINDING A FLY IN THE OINTMENT
Though Calabresi found Coase’s insight both interesting and important, if
rather unrealistic, he was skeptical that all was right with it, even from the start.
In The Decision for Accidents, Calabresi again drew upon his economics
training, this time to point out what he believed was a flaw in Coase’s
71
conclusion.
The problem, for Calabresi, lay not in Coase’s analysis per se, but in
72
whether his result would hold true in the long run as well as in the short run.
Calabresi’s specific point of concern was that different flows of liability-related
costs attending alternative assignments of liability would affect incentives for
entry into and exit from the affected industries and thus generate different longrun levels of output, or of harm-causing activity, or both. To make his point,
Calabresi invoked Coase’s farmer–rancher illustration. In doing so, he situated
both farmers and ranchers in “a perfectly competitive world” and assumed an
73
initial situation in which ranchers are liable for the harm done by their cattle.
Calabresi noted that once the parties have negotiated their way to an efficient
resolution of the problem, à la Coase, economic theory informs us that “just
enough cattle raisers and enough farmers will engage in each business at this

69. See id. at 136–38.
70. See id. at 137 n.4.
71. To that point, there had been only one critique—by Columbia University economist Stanislaw
Wellisz—leveled against the theoretical correctness of Coase’s negotiation analysis. See Wellisz, supra
note 33, at 350–54 (arguing that Coase’s result requires that at least one agent be earning rents and that
the bargaining process might create incentives for inefficiency-generating blackmail activities).
72. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 730 n.28.
73. Id.
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equilibrium so that the marginal farmer and the marginal cattle raiser will each
earn the same return on his investment—the same return in fact available in any
74
other nonmonopolistic activity.” In short, the parties would arrive at an
efficient equilibrium outcome. So far, so good.
But suppose, he said, that we alter the assignment of liability. Coase’s
analysis tells us that the result should be unchanged, but Calabresi felt that a
careful economic analysis of the situation would not sustain such a claim. The
farmers, of course, are now forced to bear the costs associated with the harm
and, as a result, will earn a correspondingly lower rate of return. Ranchers,
meanwhile, having been absolved of liability, will receive a correspondingly
higher rate of return. This, Calabresi asserted, was where Coase’s conclusion
unraveled: “Assuming, as Coase must in his perfect world, free entry and exit,
people will move into cattle raising from neutral occupations, and people will
75
leave farming to enter these same neutral occupations.” As a result, said
Calabresi, the new equilibrium that is established will include more ranchers
and fewer farmers, and thus more cattle and fewer crops, than did the original
76
equilibrium. Thus, invariance does not obtain in the long run. Rather, these
long-run entry and exit effects generate asymmetric levels of output across
77
alternative assignments of liability.
The problems for the theorem, however, did not end there. Calabresi also
argued that this long-run entry–exit process gives rise to misallocations—that is,
78
to inefficiencies. The initial bargaining activity generated an efficient mix of
crops and cattle, as Coase had demonstrated, but given this efficiency, he said,
the subsequent entry and exit effects associated with allocating the cost of
externalities to farmers must give rise to an inefficiently large number of cattle
79
and an inefficiently small amount of crops. The entry and exit critique thus
appeared to invalidate both the theorem’s efficiency claim and its invariance
claim. What Coase’s analysis had really shown, according to Calabresi, is that
“the market will operate through artificial bargains to mitigate the effect of the
80
misallocation but not to correct it altogether.”
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Calabresi’s critique of the Coase theorem on the grounds of entry and exit effects is an
excellent illustration of the large-numbers market-oriented nature of Calabresi’s framework, discussed
in part III.C, and of the Coase theorem–related implications of adopting this framework. Calabresi’s
criticism depends on the idea that certain industries impact certain other industries and that the effects
are industry wide. In the situations contemplated by Coase, an individual firm was in conflict with
another individual firm—a cattle rancher happened to be operating on land adjacent to a farmer, a
physician happened to have his examination rooms located immediately adjacent to the noisy
operations of a confectioner, and so on—meaning that, in the scenarios contemplated by Coase, the
industry-wide impacts, and thus, the entry and exit effects pointed to by Calabresi, are not relevant.
78. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 730 n.28.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 731 n.30 (emphasis added). Calabresi was not certain, though, that Coase would support
a bargaining outcome of this nature. As Calabresi noted, “Mitigation is good enough for me and the
analysis in this article; whether it suits Professor Coase as well, I do not know.” Id. at 730 n.28.
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It would seem, then, that Calabresi had introduced a fly into the Coasean
ointment, one of far greater potential significance than the practical concerns
81
that he had raised about implementation in the accident realm. Even so,
Calabresi was not convinced of the correctness of his own critique, which he
introduced only in a footnote and began with a disclaimer stating, “It is not
82
clear to me” that Coase’s result will hold up in the long run. One page later,
Calabresi chose to refer to his “doubts about” whether Coase’s result holds up
83
over time, rather than to refer back to a result that he had in some sense
“demonstrated.” In short, Calabresi did not claim to have disproved Coase’s
result, but to have called it into question. The reason for Calabresi’s qualms
about the correctness of his own analysis are unclear, though one might
speculate that, given the somewhat limited extent of his economics training, he
was uncomfortable making a definitive claim against an economist on a point of
economic theory—particularly because the point being made by Calabresi
involved rather elementary price theory that one would not expect a professor
of economics to have overlooked. Nonetheless, the combined weight of this
theoretical concern and the practical problems posed by the presence of
transaction costs led Calabresi to conclude that “we cannot assume that it
makes no difference . . . who is saddled with the original liability,” even in the
84
frictionless world contemplated by Coase.
V
REMOVING THE FLY, AND FINDING NIRVANA
One might argue that Calabresi’s qualms about his critique of Coase’s result
were, in retrospect, justified. For despite his not inconsiderable economics
background, Calabresi soon concluded that he did not quite get it right in his
1965 challenge to Coase’s analysis, as he admitted in a brief article on this
subject, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules—A
85
Comment, published in the Journal of Law and Economics in 1968.
On what basis did Calabresi retract his earlier criticism? In essence, he
invoked the Coase theorem in defense of the Coase theorem and, in doing so,
began to peel back the layers to expose the properties of life in a Coasetheorem world. Calabresi’s argument was very straightforward: Given the
existence of long-run misallocations caused by entry and exit effects, “the same
type of transactions which cured the short run misallocation would also occur to
86
cure the long run ones.” For example, if, after entry and exit effects, farming
81. See supra Part III.
82. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 730 n.28.
83. Id. at 731 n.30.
84. Id. at 731.
85. See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 67. By this time, the Journal of Law and
Economics was being edited by Coase, and Calabresi thanked both Coase and Yale Law School
colleague Ward Bowman, himself a Chicago product of sorts, for discussions related to various aspects
of this note. See id. at 67 n.*.
86. Id. at 67.
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output is too low relative to manufacturing output, said Calabresi, “those who
lose from this ‘misallocation’ would have every reason to bribe farmers to
produce more and factories to produce less,” a process that, according to
87
Calabresi, would continue until the misallocation had been fully corrected.
Efficiency and invariance, then, would obtain in both the short run and the long
run after all.
Calabresi, however, was not content to stop at this mea culpa. Instead, he
pushed the Coasean envelope even further by claiming that, at least in theory,
the domain of Coase’s negotiation result goes well beyond the joint cost–user
contexts that were the focus of Coase’s—and his own previous—analysis (that
88
is, beyond situations involving what economists typically label “externalities”).
Properly understood, Calabresi argued, Coase’s analysis showed that “if one
89
assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to
bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by
90
bargains.” That is, in a Coase-theorem world, there will be no inefficiencies
whatsoever; ostensible market failures will always be efficiently resolved via
bargaining between affected parties, whatever their number and the context of
91
the problem. In Calabresi’s hands, then, the Coase theorem was a far more
powerful tool than Coase himself had suggested.
Calabresi had thus moved very quickly from skeptic to true believer and,
having recanted his earlier charge against the Coase theorem, proceeded to
offer his most penetrating insight into the theorem to that point, an insight that
could be considered either laudatory or damning, depending on one’s
perspective:
Far from being surprising, this statement is tautological, at least if one accepts any of
the various classic definitions of misallocation. These ultimately come down to a
statement akin to the following: A misallocation exists when there is available a
possible reallocation in which all those who would lose from the reallocation could be
fully compensated by those who would gain, and, at the end of this compensation
process, there would still be some who would be better off than before.

87. Id. at 67–68. Economists continued to debate for some time whether there were other, valid
reasons why the entry-and-exit critique was legitimate. See, e.g., Medema & Zerbe, supra note 7
(containing numerous references to this literature).
88. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 68.
89. It should be noted that Coase did not assume rationality, nor did he make any other explicit
behavioral assumptions in his analysis. What is implicit in Coase’s discussion is that agents will pursue
opportunities for gain. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1, at 15.
90. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 68 (emphasis added). It might appear from this
statement that Calabresi is offering a Coase theorem that includes only the efficiency proposition and
not a claim of invariance. However, Calabresi’s accompanying footnote informs us that allocation is not
affected. See id. at 68 n.4. See also id. at 69 (discussing legal rules that replicate “the” market result that
would obtain under zero transaction costs).
91. University of Chicago economist Harold Demsetz made a nearly identical claim in an article
published in that same year. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 33 (1968)
(“The usual sources of inefficiency fail to exist in such an economic system.”).
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However, he continued:
This and other similar definitions of resource misallocation merely mean that there is
a misallocation when a situation can be improved by bargains. If people are rational,
bargains are costless, and there are no legal impediments to bargains, transactions will
ex hypothesis occur to the point where bargains can no longer improve the situation; to
the point, in short, of optimal resource allocation. We can, therefore, state as an axiom
the proposition that all externalities can be internalized and all misallocations, even
those created by legal structures, can be remedied by the market, except to the extent
that transactions cost money or the structure itself creates some impediments to
92
bargaining.

Calabresi was the first, but by no means the last, to label the Coase theorem a
93
tautology. In Calabresi’s hands, though, the theorem was a useful tautology,
for reasons that became apparent in his subsequent commentaries on Coase’s
result.
Having finally grasped the nirvana-esque properties of the Coase theorem,
Calabresi made something of a transition in his discussion of it over the next
two decades. The theorem, in effect, became an instrumental tool used by
Calabresi to make a variety of points grounded in the theorem’s very utopian
nature. One of these points involved making the theorem a centerpiece, or
benchmark, in his discussions of tort law—a trend that began with his analysis
94
in The Costs of Accidents. Though much of The Costs of Accidents was already
penned in 1965, the year in which Calabresi’s critique of the Coase theorem was
published, the influence of his 1968 about-face on the book is clear. Indeed, The
Costs of Accidents provides perhaps the best illustration of Calabresi’s
newfound sense for the importance of the Coase theorem: Coase’s result
became the basis for the book’s analysis of market-oriented solutions to tort law
problems. Duncan Kennedy has recently commented that The Costs of
Accidents “was much better than the articles that [Calabresi had] written up till
95
then.” As justification for this comment, Kennedy noted that “[t]he articles
were all basically somewhat confused in their encounter with the Coase
96
theorem.” From where Kennedy stood, it was only in The Costs of Accidents
that Calabresi developed “a coherent way of understanding the Coase theorem
97
as a lawyer.”
Calabresi’s discussions of accident law prior to The Costs of Accidents had
led with the preexisting-bargaining case and paid much less attention to Coase’s
98
negotiation result—relegating much of the discussion to footnotes. In The
92. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 68.
93. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 141 (1998);
Warren J. Samuels, The Coase Theorem and the Study of Law and Economics, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J.
1, 4, 31 (1974); Cento G. Veljanovski, The Coase Theorem: The Says Law of Welfare Economics? 53
ECON. REC. 535 (1977).
94. CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 15.
95. JAMES R. HACKNEY, LEGAL INTELLECTUALS IN CONVERSATION: REFLECTIONS ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 21 (2012).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 730–31; Calabresi, Wonderful
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Costs of Accidents, however, Calabresi opened his analysis of market solutions
with a lengthy treatment of Coase’s result, its implications, the problematic
nature of real-world negotiated solutions, and how best to proceed in light of
these problems, only taking up the preexisting-bargaining case at the end of the
99
chapter in a discussion that he labeled “[a] Detour.” Calabresi was now
essentially painting the preexisting-bargaining case as a special case of the
Coase theorem rather than, as he had done in the past, portraying the Coase
theorem as a complement to the bargaining case. More significant, however,
was his contention that “distinguishing this area”—the bargaining case—from
cases such as those contemplated by Coase “only serves to confuse matters in
100
practice.” Thus, having taken pains in his previous writings to separate this
case and the independent-agents context contemplated by Coase, Calabresi
now lumped them together. Why Calabresi made this alteration to his
discussion is unclear, but a reasonable surmise is that it grew out of the broad
101
domain that he assigned to the Coase theorem in his 1968 article. This may
also explain why Kennedy considers The Costs of Accidents to have provided a
more coherent treatment of the Coase theorem than did Calabresi’s earlier
102
writings. All of this said, Calabresi was by no means the first to lump together
the bargaining and independent cases. His distinction had disappeared in
commentaries on his and Coase’s analyses made by other legal scholars
throughout the second half of the 1960s, and these commentators had been only
too eager to ascribe both the bargaining-case insight and the independentagents insight to Coase—in apparent ignorance of the former’s lengthy legacy in
103
economic analysis.
But this benchmark aspect of the Coase theorem played a further and
perhaps more important role in Calabresi’s writing, one that involved using the
Coase theorem as something of a guide to and perhaps even justification for
real-world judicial decision making. As Calabresi pointed out in 1968, the effect
104
of Coase theorem–type bargains is to minimize the costs of accidents. Thus, if
efficiency is the goal for law, this implies that “[t]he resource allocation aim is to
approximate, both closely and cheaply, the result the market would bring about
105
if bargaining actually were costless.” Calabresi thought this point sufficiently
important to lead with it in his discussion of general deterrence in chapter seven
of The Costs of Accidents, arguing that minimizing accident costs
is the same as saying that the system would allocate the costs to those acts or activities
that an arbitrary initial bearer of accident costs would (in the absence of transaction

World, supra note 40, at 231–32.
99. CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 15, at 161.
100. Id. at 162.
101. See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 68.
102. HACKNEY, supra note 95, at 21.
103. See Medema, Debating Law’s Irrelevance, supra note 5 (discussing the early treatments of
Coase’s negotiation result in the legal literature).
104. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 71–72.
105. Id. at 69.
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and information costs) find it most worthwhile to “bribe” in 106
order to obtain that
modification of behavior which would lessen accident costs most.
107

Calabresi overtly grounded this insight in Coase’s negotiation result. In doing
so, Calabresi brought the “mimic the market” criterion into legal thinking well
108
before Richard Posner made it famous, and Calabresi used the Coase theorem
109
to provide the theoretical justification for this approach.
For Calabresi, then, the “transactions costs-free fairyland” of the Coase
110
theorem, as economist Alan Randall later described it, offered an organizing
principle for thinking about market and market-like solutions to legal issues,
provided a guide to and justification for thinking about efficiency-based judicial
decision making, and promised a tool for assessing the conditions necessary for
legal rules to generate an efficient allocation of resources. A tautology, yes, but
one that was, in Calabresi’s hands, both interesting and useful.
VI
COASEAN SOLUTIONS IN THE REAL WORLD
Though Calabresi’s 1968 defense of the Coase theorem, like his previous
discussions of Coase’s result, made no bones about the existence—and perhaps
problematic nature—of transaction costs, he did not minimize the potential
import of efficiency-enhancing negotiated solutions in situations of the sort that
he believed had been unlocked by Coase’s discussion. Although this may
appear curious in light of the mythical, nirvana-esque properties that Calabresi
associated with a Coasean world and the efforts to which he went in laying out
problems with attaining the efficient and invariant negotiated solutions
contemplated by the Coase theorem, we can achieve some measure of clarity on
this score by understanding a distinction that Calabresi made in his writings
between the Coase theorem and a broader point that he saw emerging from
Coase’s analysis in The Problem of Social Cost.
Calabresi’s 1968 discussion, although not employing the term “Coase
theorem,” is emblematic of the theorem as Calabresi conceived it. It is
noteworthy that Calabresi used the term only a handful of times in his
numerous commentaries on Coase’s negotiation result—the first coming in
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
106. CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 15, at 135.
107. See id. (noting that, absent transaction costs, “[t]his formulation implies” that it would not
matter “who bore the accident costs initially,” because “there would be bribes or transactions bringing
about any change . . . that would cause a greater reduction in accident costs than in pleasure”).
108. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17–18 (1973).
109. Calabresi also at times used the Coase theorem to combat what he considered erroneous or
hopelessly unrealistic positions adopted by others, as in his 1971 assault on Richard Posner’s defense of
the efficiency of the Learned Hand formula, see Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1058 (1972), and his 1975 critique of the fault system, Guido
Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 657 (1975) [hereinafter Calabresi,
Optimal Deterrence].
110. Alan Randall, Property Rights and Social Microeconomics, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 729, 741
n.44 (1975).
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(One View of the Cathedral), his 1972 article with Douglas Melamed —and, in
fact, there were only two occasions on which he actually specified what he
meant by the term. The first was in Tragic Choices, coauthored with Philip
Bobbitt, where Calabresi said, “Coase’s theorem . . . advises us that (assuming
no transaction costs) the market will achieve Pareto optimality regardless of
112
initial entitlements or liability rules.” A few years later, in a 1983 commentary
on some remarks by Richard Epstein on the subject of products liability,
Calabresi offered a more expansive, but essentially equivalent statement of the
theorem: “The ‘Coase Theorem’ states that, assuming the absence of
transaction costs, imposing liability on a particular party will not affect the
efficiency of the party’s undertaking; the incentives created by a liability burden
will always be shifted through bargaining onto the party best able to act on
113
them.” Both of these statements appear to be what one might call gardenvariety versions of the Coase theorem, though they are not completely
consistent with Calabresi’s 1968 commentary on this subject in the Journal of
Law and Economics in that these later statements do not explicitly include the
114
invariance proposition. Even so, when Calabresi illustrated the theorem’s
efficiency-generating magic by applying Coase’s insight to tort situations
involving large classes of potential injurers and victims, Calabresi’s illustrations
had that too-good-to-be-true utopian quality one would expect from application
to those situations in which large numbers of agents must negotiate their way to
115
solutions acceptable to each of them. But those illustrations, as Calabresi
116
emphasized, were not the “real world.”
When it came to the real world, Calabresi was not willing to completely
jettison Coase’s analysis. Instead, he repeatedly referred to a rather more
benign version of Coase’s result, the idea that parties will negotiate to
efficiency-enhancing positions when it makes sense to do so—that is, when it is
117
cost effective. This, of course, brings us back to the issue of transaction costs.
Although Calabresi’s earliest discussions of the Coase theorem emphasized
“the cost of establishing [bargaining] relationships” as the chief hurdle to be
118
overcome, he did not believe that these costs inevitably constituted an
insuperable barrier to market-based solutions to ostensible problems of market
failure. As he and Bobbitt argued in Tragic Choices, “Professor Ronald Coase
has pointed out [that] markets could cure all such defects”—problems
111. See 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1118 n.59 (1972). Calabresi and Melamed did not give the term a
specific definition.
112. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 85 (1978).
113. Guido Calabresi, Commentary, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 939, 943 n.12 (1983).
114. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 15, at 136; Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party,
and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them? 69 IOWA
L. REV. 833, 839–40 (1984) [hereinafter Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability
Systems].
116. Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems, supra note 115, at 839.
117. See, e.g., Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence, supra note 109, at 659.
118. Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40.
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associated with monopoly, public goods, and externalities—“if the cost of setting
119
up the curative market were low enough.” Once established, Calabresi seemed
to have some confidence that the market would do a reasonable job of
appropriately allocating costs and transmitting them into prices—a confidence
borne of his view that the efficacy of the market was a “probably justifiable
120
empirical conclusion.”
Calabresi offered various scenarios in which such bargaining solutions might
manifest themselves, some that involved fairly low transaction costs and others
that even countenanced the possibility that these costs are significant. The lowtransaction-cost contexts mentioned by Calabresi tended to involve situations in
which a bargaining relationship is already present and, as such, represented
both a continuation of his early emphasis on the possibility of market solutions
in the preexisting-bargaining case and his post-1970 tendency to lump these
121
cases into the Coase-theorem framework. When discussing liability rules in
One View of the Cathedral, for example, Calabresi and Melamed pointed out
that although many accident-related negotiations are likely to be extremely
(and often prohibitively) expensive, there are times when “preaccident
negotiations between potential injurers and victims are . . . not too costly,” such
as in “a typical products liability situation” where the seller may offer the
product at a reduced price if the buyer agrees not to sue in the event that he is
122
injured.
Calabresi actually provided a specific illustration of such a Coasean process
at work in his 1984 comparison of various liability systems for automobile
123
accidents. After pointing out that each of these liability systems generates an
124
efficient result in “the Coasian world of no transaction costs,” he continued by
noting that some transactions of the Coasean variety do occur “even in our far
125
from frictionless world,” one instance being Allstate Insurance Company’s
practice of offering a thirty-percent discount on the medical portion of
automobile insurance for drivers whose cars have air bags—an insight he
garnered from a telephone conversation with a corporate-relations
126
representative at Allstate. Such was Calabresi’s confidence in the propensity
of markets to facilitate this type of result that he went the further step of
119. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 112, at 83 (emphasis added).
120. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 68 n.5. That said, Calabresi was not completely
confident that his conclusions were valid under Coase’s conception of transaction costs—those
pertaining to the costs of negotiation per se: “With the kinds of costs which Coase seems to call
transaction costs, that conclusion, though possibly often still valid, cannot be accepted without more
data.” Id.
121. See supra Part III.
122. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1109 n.38 (emphasis added). Calabresi argued a
similar point in a 1985 article assessing different tests for tort liability. See Guido Calabresi & Alvin
Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 609–10 (1985).
123. See Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems, supra note 115.
124. Id. at 839.
125. Id. at 840.
126. Id. at 840 n.26.
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asserting that we might well see even more transactions of this sort “if we did
not—for good reasons, like those suggested by the antitrust laws—make some
127
agreements and transactions more difficult than they otherwise would be.”
Once again, it bears keeping in mind that both the products-liability and autoinsurance examples cited by Calabresi involve preexisting bargaining
relationships. But putting to one side the correspondence or lack thereof with
Coase’s insight, the point is that Calabresi was of the mind that private
transactions can resolve these inefficiencies even where the costs of transacting
are positive.
There was, however, a second class of situations to which Calabresi felt that
Coase’s negotiation insight was applicable, even, potentially, when transaction
costs are quite high. I have already noted Calabresi’s concern about the
problems associated with identifying the least-cost avoider—an issue that came
128
up quite regularly in his discussions of accident law. It was here, though, that
Calabresi felt Coase’s negotiation analysis provided a potential remedy for
situations in which judges have guessed wrong and allocated costs to the wrong
activity: Coase theorem–like negotiations have the potential to correct errors in
129
the assignment of liability.
Calabresi’s take on this had both a positive and a normative aspect. The
positive side of this insight made its first appearance in Calabresi’s 1965
130
commentary on Blum and Kalven and was repeated by Calabresi and
131
Melamed in One View of the Cathedral. As Calabresi and Melamed put it, “If
we were wrong in our judgments and if transactions between [the parties] were
costless or even very cheap, the entitlement . . . would be traded and an
132
economically efficient result would occur in either case.” That is, Calabresi
was of the mind that efficient negotiated solutions, à la Coase, can be achieved
even when transaction costs are nonzero and the parties are not involved in a
preexisting bargaining relationship. Although one might be inclined to wave
this aside on account of the low transaction costs assumed by Calabresi and
Melamed, the fact is that Calabresi managed to find an element of real-world
applicability in Coasean bargaining even when transaction costs are significant,
as is evident in his 1965 critique of Blum and Kalven’s complete dismissal of
133
Coase’s analysis. In spite of the overall pessimism about the feasibility of
negotiated solutions expressed in that article, Calabresi said that, in light of
Coase’s analysis, “egregious mistakes made in assigning liability in non127. Id. at 840.
128. See, e.g., Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 34, at 732.
129. See, e.g., Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 72 (“Is an erroneous placing of liability
on car owners or an erroneous placing of liability on pedestrians more likely to be corrected in the
market?”).
130. Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40.
131. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1118.
132. Id.
133. See Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40 (referring to “the practical limitations” on the
bargains contemplated by Coase).
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bargaining situations may, at least in part, be mitigated through Coasian ‘deals’
134
between independent parties.” Though not willing to go all the way, or
perhaps even very far, with the idea that bargaining can resolve social-cost
problems, Calabresi’s feeling was that if the inefficiency is sufficiently great, it
will be worthwhile for the involved parties to take on the transaction costs in
135
order to improve their situation.
But the possibilities of the market did not end there. Calabresi was also of
the mind that this self-correcting process could be aided by assignments of
liability informed by Coase’s insight, and here he put a normative spin on the
issue. If, as will often be the case, we are uncertain about which party is the
least-cost avoider, he said, the operative question becomes, Which mistaken
allocation can be cured most cheaply by parties entering into transactions with
each other in the market? The rule that emerges from this line of thinking, for
Calabresi, is that, unless we are quite certain which of the parties is the leastcost avoider, “we should put the burden on the party which can cure a mistake
most cheaply if one has been made, and thus help the market to operate as
136
effectively as possible.” And, as he noted a year later, “This amounts to the
following injunction: when in doubt, allocate the cost to the party who can most
137
cheaply enter into transactions to rectify an error.” In setting forth this
prescription, Calabresi was stating, for the first time, the idea that has become
known as the “normative Coase theorem,” which holds that one should
138
“structure the law so as to remove impediments to private agreements.” And
so once again we find Calabresi willing to countenance the idea that markets
will indeed resolve these problems in efficiency-enhancing (if not globally
efficient) fashion if transaction costs do not—or are not allowed to—get in the
way.
These twin beliefs in the correctness of the Coase theorem and the ability of
parties to negotiate efficiency-enhancing agreements in certain instances did
not, however, put Calabresi in the Coase theorem–true believer category.
Indeed, he had little patience for those who would claim a presumption in favor
of the Coase theorem when it came to practical matters of law, as we can see
from his discussion of medical malpractice in the late 1970s. Here, Calabresi
noted that there is no role for malpractice law “if one believes that negotiations
as to appropriate treatment occur between doctors and patients with sufficient

134. Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40. This statement also brought the word “Coasian”
into the lexicon.
135. As Calabresi later noted, however, efficiency is not guaranteed even if transaction costs are
low enough to facilitate bargaining to the appropriate level of deterrence, because assigning liability to
the least-cost avoider in the first place would save the relevant costs of transacting. See Calabresi,
Optimal Deterrence, supra note 109, at 659.
136. Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims?, supra note 38, at 608.
137. Guido Calabresi, Does The Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 447 (Summer 1968).
138. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 89 (2d ed. 1997).
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139

parity of knowledge of risks.” This area, he said, “seems particularly
appealing” for those predisposed to the Coase theorem’s applicability because
transaction costs, “which frequently make the pure market a poor road to an
140
utilitarian’s heaven,” seem to be absent. The cost of establishing a market, on
which Calabresi placed so much emphasis, is nonexistent. There are no large
classes of potential injurers and potential victims to assemble, because the
potential injurer is sitting right there in the examining room with the potential
141
victim. But this, said Calabresi, is little more than “a parody of the market
142
ideologue’s dream of utilitarian efficiency in medical care.” The problem in
143
this instance is “parity of knowledge” —the physician knows much more than
the victim and informed consent is costly. As a result, far from being costless,
“the medical malpractice problem [is] far more complicated than the analogous
problem of knowledge in other contractual situations” and thus far removed
144
from the realm of the Coase theorem’s applicability.
Calabresi considered Coase’s University of Chicago colleague George
Stigler an excellent example of the view that there should be a presumption in
favor of the Coase theorem. Referencing Stigler’s discussion of the Coase
145
theorem in The Theory of Price —which is where Stigler gave Coase’s result
the name that has stuck with it to this day—Calabresi and Bobbitt argued that
“[t]hough he notes that transaction costs may occasionally require state
intervention, George Stigler describes the Coase theorem as generally
suggesting that the ‘manner in which the law assigns liability will not affect the
relative private marginal costs of production,’ so that . . . it does not matter” on
146
which party liability rests. Because of this, they contended, Stigler’s position
was that the Coase theorem “counsels abstention” from nonmarket remedies
147
such as government regulation. But in a nifty turn, Calabresi and Bobbitt
continued by pointing out that “[i]f one can assume costless markets in one’s
148
theories, one can assume as well costless, perfect nonmarket approaches.”
Thus, in a Coase-theorem world, the market has nothing on government; either
one can take us to nirvana. In reality, of course, both markets and governments
are costly and imperfect, meaning that “the engaging question must be which in
fact costs more to establish in a particular situation and who bears the cost
149
under each of the two approaches.”

139. Guido Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice: Trying to Round Out the Circle, 27 U.
TORONTO L.J. 131, 131–32 (1977).
140. Id. at 132.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (illustrating Calabresi’s more expansive definition of transaction costs).
145. STIGLER, supra note 3, at 113.
146. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 112, at 213 n.3.
147. Id. at 85.
148. Id. at 213 n.4.
149. Id.
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VII
ITALIAN CONSPIRACY: CALABRESI, PARETO, AND THE DEATH OF THE COASE
THEOREM
I have observed in the foregoing discussion that Calabresi’s attitude toward
Coase’s negotiation result evolved significantly and in several directions over
the course of his career. But none of these moves had implications nearly as
dramatic as his final move—to place the Coase theorem in a Paretian-efficiency
framework. Calabresi’s earliest discussions of the Coase theorem had painted
Coase’s result as one in which negotiations would lead to outcomes that
150
minimized the costs associated with accidents. Here, as in his analysis of
accident law generally, Calabresi implicitly adopted what economists call a
151
Kaldor–Hicks definition of efficiency. Under the Kaldor–Hicks criterion, a
move is considered efficiency-enhancing if the resulting gains outweigh the
losses, and a given position is considered to be efficient if there is no possible
152
move that generates gains to the winners that exceed the losses to the losers.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, Calabresi altered his approach and
began to assess bargaining solutions through a different efficiency lens—the
Paretian one. The Pareto criterion says that a move is efficiency enhancing only
if at least one person gains from the move and no one loses, and that a
particular outcome is efficient if there is no move from that position which
153
leaves each party at least as well off as they were in the original position.
Although there is no distinction to be made between Kaldor–Hicks and Pareto
efficiency in a Coase-theorem world of zero transaction costs—a point that
Calabresi later recognized—the same cannot be said for the real world of
154
positive transaction costs. And, as Calabresi discussed at great length in The
155
Pointlessness of Pareto, but also elsewhere, the distinction is one of significant
import when it comes to evaluating Coasean bargaining and to the utilization of
the insights provided by the Coase theorem in the evaluation of legal rules in a
156
world filled with frictions.
Calabresi’s evolution from Kaldor–Hicks to Pareto can be seen in his 1968
correction of his earlier critique of the Coase theorem. Here, Calabresi defined
a misallocation not as a failure to, for example, minimize costs (a Kaldor–Hicks
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See, e.g., Calabresi, Wonderful World, supra note 40; Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents,
supra note 34.
152. See, e.g., ROGER E. BACKHOUSE, THE ORDINARY BUSINESS OF LIFE: A HISTORY OF
ECONOMICS FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 279–80 (2002).
153. Kaldor–Hicks efficiency does not mandate that compensation be paid to those who would be
made worse off by the move in question. Id. It is only when such compensation actually is paid that the
move in question satisfies the Pareto criterion. Id. This makes the Pareto criterion more restrictive than
Kaldor–Hicks as a welfare measure.
154. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211,
1222 (1991) [hereinafter Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto]. If transaction costs are zero, the
compensation payments necessary for the satisfaction of the Pareto criterion can be costlessly arranged.
155. See, e.g., CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 112, at 83–85.
156. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 154, at 1223.
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notion), but rather as a situation where “there is available a possible
reallocation in which all those who would lose from the reallocation could be
fully compensated by those who would gain, and, at the end of this
compensation process, there would still be some who would be better off than
157
158
before.” This, of course, is a classic Paretian exposition, and the implication,
as Calabresi pointed out, is that “there is a misallocation when a situation can
159
be improved by bargains.” But this is where Coase’s analysis provides a path
to efficiency, at least in theory: “If people are rational, bargains are costless, and
there are no legal impediments to bargains,” said Calabresi, “transactions will
ex hypothesis occur to the point where bargains can no longer improve the
160
situation; to the point, in short, of optimal resource allocation.”
It is important to take note of the contrast between Calabresi’s stance here
and Coase’s own 1960 emphasis on the outcome “which maximises the value of
161
production.” Coase, as this statement makes clear, was not working with a
Paretian conception of efficiency, but with one having more of a Kaldor–Hicks
or wealth-maximization flavor. Indeed, this is the criterion that had informed
162
Coase’s earlier work in the realm of welfare theory, which he utilized in his
examples in The Problem of Social Cost, and whose implications he defended in
163
his few subsequent commentaries on the Coase theorem. That said, Calabresi
was by no means the first or the last to read the Coase theorem through
164
Paretian lenses, Coase’s own wealth-maximization approach notwithstanding.
165
Why Calabresi began to do so at this point is unclear, and he made little of the
166
implications of this analysis until some two decades later. But if, as I have
already noted, the efficiency criterion employed does not matter in a Coasetheorem world, why is Calabresi’s Paretian turn of any interest or import?
Three reasons can be suggested.
First, from a pure Coase-theorem perspective, it is the Paretian framework
that renders the theorem tautological. Once bargaining has ceased, the result
must be optimal by definition; if welfare-improving bargains were possible, they
157. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 68.
158. Although one could interpret Calabresi’s statement in Kaldor–Hicks terms, it is clear from the
context of his discussion that Calabresi is speaking in terms of compensation actually being paid, per
the Paretian conception.
159. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 68.
160. Id.
161. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1, at 8.
162. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (1946) (containing
Coase’s analysis of pricing regulation for natural monopoly).
163. See, e.g., COASE, Notes, supra note 2.
164. This trend began with Buchanan and Stubblebine’s classic article Externality and soon became
commonplace. See James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371
(1962).
165. Calabresi himself is unsure why he made this move. E-mail from Guido Calabresi, Senior
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale Law
Sch., to author (Oct. 12, 2012, 8:24 AM) (on file with author).
166. One exception to this is his discussion in Tragic Choices. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra
note 112, at 85–86.
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would be (or would already have been) consummated.
Kaldor–Hicks
efficiency, or wealth maximization, has no such implications. The problems with
putting Coase’s negotiation result in a Paretian context, however, go well
beyond the tautology issue: It effectively destroys the Coase theorem as
typically conceived—indeed, as a theoretical construct of any interest at all. The
theorem tells us that an efficient and invariant result will be achieved in a world
of zero transaction costs. The implication, though, is that efficiency is anything
but guaranteed when transaction costs are positive. But as Calabresi recognized
in 1991, it is equally true that Pareto efficiency will obtain in any state of the
168
world. To put it in his 1968 language, transactions will always, even when
transaction costs are positive, “ex hypothesis occur to the point where bargains
can no longer improve the situation; to the point, in short, of optimal resource
169
allocation.” Thus, the Coase theorem’s assumptions about costless transacting
are not required; parties will negotiate all mutually beneficial improvements—
all those for which the benefits outweigh the costs, including the costs of
transacting. Moreover, any existing transaction costs or other impediments to
bargaining are themselves Pareto optimal; otherwise, steps would have been
170
taken to remove them. In short, what is, is efficient, and the Coase theorem’s
efficiency proposition does not require that we make any assumptions regarding
the magnitude of transaction costs.
The adoption of the Paretian-efficiency framework, though, has a second
important and related effect: It alters the nature of the invariance argument. In
Coase’s framework in The Problem of Social Cost, there exists a unique wealthmaximizing result, Q*. Likewise, Calabresi had assumed, in his discussions of
accident law, that there exists a unique cost-minimizing allocation. Invariance,
then, obtains only if the actual outcome is Q* independent of the initial
assignment of rights. In such a world, the Coase theorem tells us that the level
of deterrence activity, the presence or absence of fencing between farmers and
cattle ranchers, the amount of pollution and of various types of pollutiongenerating factories or products, and so forth, are all invariant across alternative
assignments of rights.
In the Paretian context, however, the situation is altered. There is no metric
for comparing one result with another—each is equally good if the gains from
trade have been exhausted. Furthermore, it is almost trivial to construct a
scenario in which the actual outcome is dependent on the assignment of rights,
171
as economist F.T. Dolbear showed in 1967. The error of the invariance thesis
167. Calabresi, of course, made the tautology argument in force in his 1968 article; interestingly,
though, he did not explicitly link back to this tautology discussion in The Pointlessness of Pareto, in
spite of the fact that his 1991 analysis made the tautology argument with even greater force, and more
expansively. See Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 154, at 1222.
168. See id. at 1215–16.
169. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, supra note 65, at 68.
170. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 154, at 1216.
171. See F. Trenery Dolbear, Jr., On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 90
(1967).
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in a Paretian system is so obvious that Calabresi’s move to the Pareto criterion
led him, rather charitably, to absolve Coase from responsibility for this
proposition: “Some confusion arose,” said Calabresi, “because Coase seemed to
say that whatever the starting points, absent transaction costs, the same end
point would be reached. . . . What Coase (and his followers) clearly meant,
however, was that, absent transaction costs, an equally efficient point would be
172
reached regardless of starting points.” But this reading of Coase, though
173
favorable, is inaccurate. Coase, like the early Calabresi, spoke in terms of
identical, not simply identically efficient, outcomes, as did the majority of
Coase’s followers—particularly within the Chicago law-and-economics
tradition, with its wealth-maximization norm. If Coase had been working in a
Paretian context, he may well not have made the error of claiming invariance.
But he was working in a wealth-maximization framework and the invariance
claim—in terms of identical outcomes—is both explicit in his discussion and of
significant import for the point he was making.
A third byproduct of adopting the Paretian framework is the invalidation of
174
the so-called normative Coase theorem. Though Calabresi had played no
small part in introducing this idea into the economic analysis of law in the late
1960s, we find him arguing a very different line in 1991. “Some,” Calabresi
asserted, “say that if transaction costs keep us from making Pareto-superior
moves, we should remove the impediments to transactions. We should, for
example, implement legal changes that foster inexpensive negotiations and
175
markets. Such changes, they argue, will lead to Pareto improvements.” Of
course, this “[s]ome” included the early Calabresi! But Calabresi circa 1991 saw
the matter very differently. Someone, and perhaps many someones (and not
necessarily the parties directly involved in the dispute in question), he pointed
out, will lose from the process of removing these impediments to negotiation; if
176
this were not the case, the impediments would have already been removed.
Thus, it may be that removing impediments to bargaining will be wealth
enhancing in a Kaldor–Hicks sense, but such moves create both winners and
177
losers, meaning that they cannot be Pareto superior.
Although Calabresi’s Paretian turn had dire implications for judicial
attempts to mimic the market, proponents of regulatory remedies did not
escape unscathed. This same reasoning, as Calabresi emphasized, applies to any
government action targeted at promoting efficiency: “It is no use,” he argued,
“to say that, when transaction costs keep us from achieving a state in which
some are better off and none worse off, we should use ‘non-market methods’ to

172. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 154, at 1215 n.12.
173. As noted above, Calabresi dropped the invariance thesis from his statements of the Coase
theorem in the mid-1970s. See supra text accompanying note 114.
174. See supra text accompanying note 138.
175. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 154, at 1220.
176. See id.
177. Id.
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178

reach that position.” Though it may appear that nonmarket forms of
organization offer a lower-cost alternative when transaction costs are high, the
fact is that “[i]f we knew of and had available to us a nonmarket method that is
179
ex ante Pareto superior, we would already have used it!” If a nonmarket
method has not emerged, then, it must be the case that some agents perceive
180
that they would lose under such a method.
Thus, both those policies favored by Coase theorem–loving advocates of
market solutions and those favored by advocates of, for example, direct
government regulation fail the Pareto test, as a result of which Calabresi
asserted that the Pareto criterion cannot “be of any real guidance” when it
181
comes to legal issues. This, for Calabresi, reflects “[t]he essence of Coase’s
insight” in The Nature of the Firm and The Problem of Social Cost—the idea
that “transaction costs are no different from any other costs” and, as such, play
182
a role in defining the Pareto frontier. Calabresi had arrived at a point, then,
where the Coase theorem was anything but a magic elixir, and instead “reveals
the bankruptcy of the neoclassical welfare economics’ Pareto standards as
183
guides for policy making.” We are left, in the end, with a “Calabresi
184
theorem,” the message of which is that what is, is efficient.
Calabresi the “economist” had thus put himself in an interesting position.
Having eschewed Kaldor–Hicks in favor of Pareto, and having shown that the
Pareto criterion fails as a guide to policy, he was left, and left us, without any
operational method for making the efficiency judgments that are at the heart of
welfare economics—that are, indeed, the only arrow in the economist’s welfare
quiver. As Calabresi realized, there was only one direction in which to move:
The inability of the Pareto criterion to provide any guidance for policy “makes
inevitable a thoroughgoing and open discussion of distribution and of
185
interpersonal comparisons.” This, of course, takes the economist into territory
that is both unfamiliar and unsettling. But it also took Calabresi far from the
least-cost avoider arguments that had been central to his analysis of tort law.
In a curious way, all of this brought Calabresi back to the same position in
which he had been in 1968—though perhaps without realizing it. For, in spite of
the tendency to associate the Coase theorem with the market-oriented wealthmaximizing metric of Chicago, the theorem plays into the hands of the more
186
distributionally concerned New Haven. Indeed, the world of the Coase
178. Id.
179. Id. Calabresi saw this insight as a consequence of Coase’s analysis in The Nature of the Firm.
See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
180. Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 154, at 1220.
181. Id. at 1224; see also id. at 1218–20.
182. Id. at 1218. The Pareto frontier shows the set of Pareto-efficient points that are attainable.
183. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 112, at 85.
184. See Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, supra note 154, at 1212.
185. Id. at 1224.
186. The distributional concerns of the New Haven approach to law and economics carry forward
an important aspect of the legal-realist tradition at Yale. On this tradition, see, for example, LAURA
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theorem is “the best of all possible worlds” for those concerned with
187
distributional issues. There is no equity–efficiency tradeoff, no “leaky
bucket.” For New Haven, the Coase theorem tells us that we need not sacrifice
efficiency to indulge distributional preferences or goals: No matter how rights
are assigned and thus no matter how distributional goals inform the assignment
of rights, the allocation that results will be efficient. New Haven can thus beat
Chicago at its own game. Posner’s arguments about the lack of legitimacy
underpinning any particular notion of justice, morals, and so on, and his
pragmatist defense of the efficiency criterion as the appropriate goal for law
become moot points in a Coase-theorem world, because efficiency is
188
guaranteed.
As Calabresi showed in 1991, however, the Pareto criterion has nearly
identical implications for a world of positive transaction costs: All equilibria are
efficient and strictly noncomparable, meaning that distributional considerations
involve no efficiency-related sacrifices. Once again, Calabresi and New Haven
have the upper hand. Ironically, though, one could apply the same argument to
189
support Blum and Kalven’s social-insurance tort scheme or to any of the
several other approaches to tort liability against which Calabresi leveled
(Kaldor–Hicks) efficiency-based critiques over the years. Moreover, assessing
transaction cost–reducing moves is not an efficiency-related exercise, but
instead requires distributional judgments as between winners and losers and,
where multiple transaction cost–reducing options exist, as between different
groups of winners and losers.
The adoption of the Pareto criterion thus had the effect of facilitating
Calabresi’s distributional turn. When wealth maximization is the goal,
distribution is an alternative to efficiency and at times competes with it. Under
the Pareto criterion, in contrast, the choice is ultimately about which efficient
outcome we desire and the normative basis for such choices. In the end, then,
the Coase theorem, read through Calabresian lenses, reinforces the importance
of distributional considerations and the value judgments that underlie them.
And so Calabresi had, via Coase, come round full circle to his legal-realist
190
roots.
VIII
CONCLUSION
When Duncan Kennedy recently suggested that, up to the mid-1970s, only
Calabresi and Posner were “percolating” the Coase theorem “in mainstream

KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); Laura Kalman, Some Thoughts on Yale and
Guido, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 15, 20–21.
187. VOLTAIRE, supra note 57.
188. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY (2001).
189. See Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives, supra note 40, at 674.
190. See supra Part I.
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legal academia,” he overlooked a vast literature that saw lawyers at leading
law schools probing the implications of Coase’s insight for the evaluation of
192
legal rules. That said, there can be no question that Calabresi deserves much
of the credit—or perhaps, in the eyes of some, the blame—for putting the Coase
theorem on the map of the legal community.
The Coase theorem was a useful weapon in Calabresi’s crusade to replace
the fault system with a market-based system of deterrence. It showed the
conditions under which the market could efficiently accomplish such
deterrence, and the real-world impediments to the accomplishment of the
results contemplated by the Coase theorem provided Calabresi with a blueprint
for factors that should be taken into account in devising a system to properly
allocate costs in a world of imperfect markets. By the end of the 1960s,
Calabresi was a committed believer in the theorem’s logic and utility, even if
equally convinced of its limited direct real-world applicability. Equally
important, he “understood that Coase’s insight was not an ideological insight,
193
but rather a purely scholarly one.”
Calabresi’s 1968 article on the Coase theorem stands out as the first in the
literature—either legal or economic—to realize what the Coase theorem was
really all about. Calabresi said, in essence, “This is how the magical world
works. It is not a tool for direct application, but a fiction.” As I have already
detailed, however, for Calabresi it was a useful fiction, or model, in spite of its
unrealism. As he has recently noted,
Model-making is useful because it spins out boxes. Then the question becomes, “Are
the boxes full, or are the boxes empty?” A model may point to something that is of no
use at all. Making a model, the simplest model, like the one I used in the Cathedral
article, says, “Here is a box. Gee, that is interesting, there is a box there. Is there
anything in the real world that fills that box?” If there isn’t, one can throw the model
out. But the model may well cause one to see something that the canonical way of
194
looking at things has caused one to miss.

And the Coase theorem did exactly this for Calabresi, which explains why he
returned to it time and again over the course of his career.
Calabresi’s original attraction to Coase’s insight no doubt was sparked by
the correspondence that he saw between it and the established economic theory
pertaining to what he called the (preexisting) bargaining case. As his
understanding of the theorem evolved, however, so too did his sense for why it
was useful—a sense that increasingly converged toward Coase’s larger message
in The Problem of Social Cost and away from the silliness that makes up so
much of the commentary, pro and con, on the Coase theorem: “Like the
physicist’s assumption of no friction or Say’s law in macro-economics,” said
Calabresi and Melamed, “the assumption of no transaction costs may be a
useful starting point, a device which helps us see how, as different elements
191.
192.
193.
194.

HACKNEY, supra note 95, at 22.
See Medema, Debating Law’s Irrelevance, supra note 5.
Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, supra note 10, at 738.
Id. at 752–53.
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which may be termed transaction costs become important, the goal of economic
195
efficiency starts to prefer one allocation of entitlements over another.” For
the early Calabresi, at least, this pointed toward the mimic-the-market criterion
and the normative Coase theorem. And while Calabresi was eventually to
throw all of this in the dustbin as part of his embrace of Pareto, the place of the
Coase theorem and its normative corollaries in the economic analysis of law
was long since secured—ironically, in no small part due to Calabresi’s efforts.

195. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1096.

